쾌고감수성

쾌락이나 고통에 대한 의식 경험을 할 수 있는 능력.

예측하는 뇌 가설 관점에서의 설명

행위자가 감응력을 가지기 위한 조건:

We can now think of sentient beings as those whose neural model of the world is in constant two-way communication with a model of their own changing physiological state. Basic sentience emerges in creatures whose sensitivities to states of the external world are subtly but pervasively responsive to the likely future states of their own bodies and metabolisms. These creatures don’t just see a tree, or a shadow—they see a source of much needed food, or the threat of an imminent attack. Such creatures will perceptually encounter a world fit for action, in which what actions are selected depends heavily upon a sense of their current and ongoing bodily state and needs, and how well they are doing at minimizing salient error. They live, we might say, in a world that is temporally extended and perceptually meaningful. Bodily self-regulation, action, and temporal depth are, predictive processing thus suggests, jointly necessary if there is to be conscious experience at all.

Creatures like that will certainly appear sentient. They will respond to their worlds in ways informed by a delicate dance between what they detect in the external world and their own ever-changing bodily needs and states. This, I argue, is what underlies all the behavioral manifestations of “sentience.” We detect sentience in creatures (and potentially in robots) whose take on the external world is subtly but pervasively responsive to their brain or control system’s take on their own inner, bodily worlds and their own states of action readiness.

—p119