A book explaining limitarianism, the view that possessing wealth beyond a certain amount is immoral and that institutions should prevent individuals from exceeding that amount.

Introduction

As of 2022, Elon Musk’s wealth was $219B. Accumulating that sum would require working fifty hours a week from age twenty to sixty-five, without taking a single day off, earning $1.8M (about 2.5 billion won) per hour. According to Forbes in 2020, 2,668 people held at least $1B. Including people with at least $1M in assets makes the number much larger.

In 2012, the author began examining the problems caused by extreme wealth, rather than extreme poverty, with researchers in philosophy, economics, and sociology. She became convinced that it poses moral as well as political-economic problems, and that individuals’ wealth should be capped. She named this limitarianism.

Limitarianism is not a cure-all, however; it is closer to a regulative ideal. The book proposes theories and means for approaching that ideal, with three practical dimensions: structural, fiscal, and ethical.

(I understand universal basic income as raising the floor, and limitarianism as lowering the ceiling. If the two met, it would be a dystopia in which everyone owned identical wealth, but I agree with narrowing the gap between them. —ak)

Chapter 1. How much is too much?

Increasing inequality comes from two phenomena: the poor becoming poorer, and the rich becoming richer. An increase in poverty is relatively visible to the public, but an increase in the rich rarely is. Inequality has increased over recent decades without feeling as pronounced because the rich have grown richer.

According to Thomas Piketty’s 2013 Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the wealth gap narrowed immediately after World War II but began growing again after the 1970s. According to Oxfam 2023, between 2020 and 2022 the global top 1% gained twice as much wealth as the remaining 99% combined.

Research and civil society surveys in various countries suggest there is a publicly agreeable threshold distinguishing the rich from the superrich (varying by country: €1M in the Netherlands, $5M in the United States, etc.). What matters is not the exact figure but that people could consistently make this distinction.

Roughly, this is the point beyond which more money no longer meaningfully changes one’s quality of life. Better social safety nets and public services reduce the need to accumulate money for emergencies, so the threshold varies across societies.

Limitarianism proposes three thresholds.

Riches line: The dividing point between the rich and superrich
Ethical limit: The point beyond which possessing more becomes difficult to justify morally
Political limit: The point beyond which the state should prevent further holdings

These three thresholds can vary by society. Again, limitarianism’s core is not proposing precise figures, but explaining why a world without excessive concentrations of wealth benefits everyone more.

Chapter 2. It’s keeping the poor in poverty while inequality grows

According to Oxfam 2023, most wealth created between 2012 and 2021 went to the top 1%: $54 of every $100, while the bottom 50% received just $0.7. Yet Our World in Data reports a dramatic fall in extreme poverty, from 90% in 1820 to 10% in 2015. Why?

The first problem is the use of estimates, since little poverty data exists before 1981. Economist R. Allen argues that estimating expenditure is more accurate than estimating income—for example, examining what kinds and quantities of food people could actually eat—whereas existing estimates rely on income.

The second problem is the threshold for “extreme poverty.” Our World in Data uses purchasing power of $1.9 per day at 2011 prices, lower than that of slaves in the nineteenth-century US. Some economists argue for thresholds of $4.5–$15. At $10, two-thirds of the world remains in extreme poverty.

Broadly, the Global North’s exploitation of the Global South (blocking flows of labor and agricultural products while liberalizing finance, assassinating reformist leaders, etc.) and the concentration of wealth in certain Northern countries (the US foremost, and in Asia including Korea, China, and Japan) are serious problems. The US has just 4.5% of the world’s population, but Americans make up 53% of people with assets above $50M.

The increasing concentration matters too. In the United States, total wealth grew from $23.6T (1990) to $135.8T (2020). Had it been distributed equally, the bottom 50%‘s total wealth should have risen from $1.7T to $57.8T, but it reached only $4.4T. Most went to the top 10%. Concentration is worsening both proportionally and in absolute terms.

Wealth inequality also has gender and racial dimensions. White men, for example, are more likely to be in the top 50% than people of color or women. Racial differences are especially pronounced in societies with past or present slavery or racism. In the US, Latino and Hispanic people make up 20% of the population but hold only 3% of the wealth.

Discussing wealth concentration ultimately requires discussing “class,” a taboo in many societies. A joke about class:

American 1: Know how the American class system works?
American 2: America has a class system?
American 1: Yes. That’s exactly how it works.

After the French Revolution, the legal/formal idea that everyone is equal spread, and we came to believe everyone is substantively equal. The data says otherwise. Despite constitutional language, opportunities and outcomes are unequal, and this is not a problem caused by differences in talent or individual choices.

How did we get here? Neoliberalism, originating in the 1930s, gained ascendancy in the 1970s. Market fundamentalism, deregulation, privatization of public services, and attributing wealth to personal diligence (poverty to laziness) accelerated the rich-get-richer, poor-get-poorer dynamic and unleashed wealth accumulation.

Objections include focusing on poverty rather than inequality (excessive accumulation is not itself a problem), and arguing that trickle-down wealth can benefit society. The problem with the first is that solving poverty while ignoring inequality is practically impossible. According to M. Desmond, poverty results from government policies favoring the rich.

Trickle-down economics has repeatedly been refuted by empirical research. There is no trickle-down, only trickle-up. Evidence of the opposite—inequality’s harmful economic effects—keeps accumulating. Nevertheless, trickle-down theory refuses to die, returning like a zombie.

Chapter 3. It’s dirty money

Accumulating extreme wealth rarely happens without harming the world.

The first category is wealth from crimes against humanity: companies and individuals who accumulated wealth through cooperation with the Nazis, such as BMW and Porsche, and their heirs. Some operated factories through slave labor under the Nazis. Another example is slavery. Particularly in the US, today’s white-black wealth gap is a direct legacy of slavery, while systematic discrimination also persists. (Examples from other countries omitted.) There is no moral justification for wealth accumulated this way.

The second category is kleptocracy and corrupt officials: leaders and bureaucrats who rob their own people. Kleptocracy not only drives citizens into extreme poverty, but entails human rights abuses, including violence and torture, to maintain wealth and power, alongside election fraud, imprisonment or assassination of political opponents, and countless other crimes. Kleptocracy and corruption are serious in wealthy countries such as Korea as well as poor countries. Their effects also cross borders: Putin and his circle, for example, illegally fund right-wing politicians abroad to secure allies. Official corruption is also a serious problem.

The third category is companies that accumulate wealth by knowingly harming customers. The Sackler family’s Purdue Pharma knew OxyContin was addictive yet falsely promoted it as “relatively less addictive,” causing addiction and death on a vast scale. Privatizing profits and handing losses to the state (thus spreading them across all citizens) is common too. A representative case is the 2008 global financial crisis. One root cause was financial deregulation resulting from years of legislative lobbying by the superrich. (Other examples omitted.) Amazon is known for poor working conditions and low pay, but instead of fundamental improvements, it dresses them up in pleasant language: calling warehouses “fulfillment centers,” for example (Korea follows suit).

The fourth category is tax avoidance and evasion. By definition avoidance is legal and evasion illegal, but the boundary is very unclear. Most countries design taxes so high earners pay more, yet the superrich actually pay less. This may be legal, but is hard to call moral. Corporate avoidance and evasion are also widespread. For example, Google established Google Holdings in Bermuda and arranged for its European branches to pay it royalties, reducing European profits and avoiding tax. Bermuda has no tax. Saez and Zucman estimate that nearly 60% of US multinationals’ profits are handled this way. There is even a ‘wealth-defense industry,’ serving heirs, CEOs, and other superrich clients. Meanwhile, the rich continually lobby across borders to reshape tax systems in their favor (tax cuts for the rich, for example). Legal ‘avoidance’ is safer for them, after all.

Many people condemn criminal proceeds or kleptocracy yet see no issue with their own wealth because they accumulated it legally. But considering 1) the blurred line between legal and illegal and 2) laws’ increasing bias toward the rich, maintaining extreme wealth morally is nearly impossible.

Chapter 4. It’s undermining democracy

As Chapter 3 showed, kleptocracy clearly undermines democracy (Putin and his circle, for example). There are many other harms. First is the commodification of citizenship. Many countries sell citizenship at high prices, effectively selling political rights such as voting rights. Reasons for buying golden passports or visas include a more stable life, escape after crimes, and business convenience. Peter Thiel (a US right-wing businessman, PayPal Mafia member, and author of Zero to One) bought a New Zealand passport despite having no connection to the country, acquired citizenship in twelve days, and bought substantial land as a refuge from disasters such as the climate crisis.

Maltese passports are particularly popular among the rich because they allow access to every EU member state.

What is wrong with selling passports?

First, inequality in the means of acquiring political rights.
Second, it often rewards crime. Many who buy Maltese passports and citizenship are Russian criminals.

Their experiences contrast starkly with those of penniless refugees. Between 2014 and 2022, 25,000 refugees died while traveling to Europe by boat. Malta is notorious for failing its duty to assist refugees in distress. In London, refugees live in windowless rooms smaller than prison cells.

Another way money damages democracy is political donations by the superrich. Large donations buy substantial influence over politicians. Most politicians do not acknowledge this clearly, though there are odd cases like Donald Trump openly admitting it on television in 2015. Large donations affect not just individual politicians but the national political agenda. Those unable to donate enough struggle to have their opinions adequately represented. According to M. Gilens and B. Page, US policy decisions tend to favor businesses and capitalists.

Another method is corporate threats to governments: threatening to relocate major facilities abroad unless the government complies. Such threats are rarely discovered, of course, because companies do not put them in writing.

Another way money damages democracy is media ownership by tycoons. They buy newspapers and broadcasters and use them to create and spread information they favor: Rupert Murdoch, for example. Meaningful voting requires citizens making rational decisions from accurate information, which this undermines.

Another method is operating or funding think tanks and political research institutes, providing frameworks that interpret political, social, and economic issues in their favor. More money enables more investment and therefore more influence over public opinion.

The larger problem is that the superrich cooperate to maximize one another’s wealth, distorting institutions in varied, systematic ways. Not every rich person actively does this, but believing there is nothing wrong with one’s abnormal increase in wealth supports the current unfair system.

Chapter 5. It’s setting the world on fire

The Russo-Ukrainian War drove oil prices sharply upward, leaving many people unable to afford heating oil. Meanwhile, energy companies such as BP, Shell, and Exxon saw major revenue increases. They exploited wartime turmoil to extract more money from ordinary people’s pockets.

The superrich consume enormous amounts of energy, flying private jets and so on, while everyone shares the costs. They could invest in clean energy, but invest instead in environmentally harmful space travel. Solving global problems requires money, yet most people who have plenty have no intention of investing in it.

People in poor countries suffer most from droughts, floods, and extreme climate change, while the superrich cause the most harm. Wealth and carbon emissions are very strongly correlated. A substantial share of the world’s population has never flown.

Chapter 6. Nobody deserves to be a multimillionaire

An argument always heard in tax debates: “Money earned in the market belongs to individuals, and government must not touch it. Wealth is the legitimate result of individual talent and effort.” If true, this would seriously undermine limitarianism’s case.

Limitarianism rests on the fundamental insight that markets and property are social institutions. Remove their social context (shared rules and norms and the government coordinating them), and neither markets nor property can exist. Government requires resources: taxes. Secure private property cannot exist without taxation.

Whether to collect tax is not the question. The question is whom to tax, when, and how much, fairly.

The first issue is inheritance tax. Given its abolition in some countries, tax havens, and elaborate accounting techniques, current superrich wealth will probably be passed down almost intact unless major changes occur. Inheritance is inherently unfair: people receive vast wealth merely by being born into rich families. Philosopher D. W. Haslett asks why inherited political power was abolished while inherited property remains. (Mathematician B. Russell said something similar a century ago. See Russell on inheritance of property.)

Defenders of inheritance say people are free to decide to whom they give their property. But freedom to harm others should be restricted. Passing down huge fortunes harms society, undermining equal opportunity and weakening individual incentives.

Another objection is double taxation. But a bequest tax (taxing the act of giving your property freely to someone) differs from an inheritance tax (taxing the act of receiving someone’s property freely). A completely new approach to inheritance is needed, introduced later. (In Chapter 10, the author proposes capping inheritance and distributing the remainder equally to the younger generation.)

Next is excessively high labor income. As Chapter 3 showed, it is highly questionable whether enormous salaries always fairly reward work. Between 1978 and 2021, US CEO pay increased 1,460%, while workers’ pay rose 18%. CEOs earn on average 399 times workers’ salaries. Are huge CEO, sports, and entertainment salaries justified?

First objection: “They earn a lot because the work is difficult.” But plenty of relatively easy work is highly paid, while difficult work (childcare, for example) is not.
Second objection: “They earn a lot because the work requires extraordinary talent.” If so, pay should fall substantially in low-performance years, but it does not. Second, talent matters less in monopolistic competition. Many successful people attribute success to their talent, but studies suggest this is merely attribution bias. Even if extraordinary talent truly is the cause, a deeper problem remains. According to A theory of justice, talent is a natural lottery. Being lucky enough to be born talented cannot justify enormous income. Taken too far, this argument risks determinism. It does not mean individuals can do nothing. Rather, we should more fully accept that innate talent, luck, and other factors unrelated to effort play major roles, and that talent does not readily justify so much money. This does not mean everyone’s income must be identical; the problem is that the differences are too large.

Income differences within limits can be justified by several principles.

First, occupations impose different burdens, which income should reflect.
Second, income differences can motivate people to enter certain occupations society depends on, such as medicine.

One might also argue that entrepreneurs create wealth and jobs and therefore deserve large fortunes. But is it just for Amazon’s CEO to receive so much while working conditions remain poor? What about workers in Apple’s overseas factories? Is it legitimate for Zara to make enormous profits through environmentally destructive “fast fashion”?

More fundamentally, almost all value created in modern society depends on existing social infrastructure. Imagine a shipwreck leaving one group on an island with absolutely nothing, and another on an uninhabited island containing a fully equipped modern city, simply without people. The difference in productivity would be enormous.

Could Google or Amazon exist without the internet, the product of long cooperation among many countries? Great wealth invariably depends on many other people’s long efforts. Pharmaceutical companies cannot exist without countless scientists’ research.

Neoliberals claim anyone can become rich through effort. But this is merely a narrative favored by the ruling class. Empirical studies show social mobility becoming increasingly difficult. Improving matters requires confronting this problem; insisting there is no problem prevents improvement.

Some say limitarianism violates equal opportunity, a fundamental principle of democracy. But limitarianism limits particular financial rewards associated with opportunities, not the opportunities themselves. Becoming a CEO is fine; receiving excessive compensation as one is the problem.

In a limitarian society, everyone would have health insurance, high-quality public education, affordable housing, and work without excessive stress, allowing them to enjoy life. Modern society is nothing like this.

Chapter 7. There’s so much we can do with the money

(The title brings to mind Michael Sandel’s What money can’t buy. If I remember correctly, its conclusion was that almost nothing in modern society cannot be bought, hahaha.)

In 2021–2022, at the height of COVID-19, while countless people died or suffered, the wealth of America’s 400 richest people increased 40%. Those who should have shared the suffering and shouldered greater responsibility avoided it and reaped benefits, tutoring their children privately in luxurious vacation homes.

Had the rich been taxed properly, as before neoliberalism, governments could have done a great deal. Average wellbeing would have improved substantially because of the law of diminishing marginal utility. An extra $1,000 a month makes little difference to the rich but can transform poor people’s lives.

The superrich spend $28M on twelve minutes of private space travel, an amount estimated to save about 6,200 lives. Their wealth should be redistributed for vulnerable people suffering now. This is both efficient and morally right.

This assumes, however, that money can solve many problems. Can it? Some, such as social discrimination against minorities, cannot be solved by money alone, but money helps even with those.

One of the most direct and effective methods is unconditional universal basic income for all. Empirical evidence includes the 2008–2009 Namibian UBI experiment. Living standards improved dramatically, and contrary to neoliberal fears, people did not become lazy. Means-tested welfare, giving money only to those meeting specified conditions, is less efficient: setting criteria, checking eligibility, and distributing money only to selected recipients all entail inefficiency and unnecessary spending.

Extreme poverty is not confined to poor countries. Wealthy countries have serious problems too: 40% of their citizens are financially insecure. The 2022 documentary The American Dream and Other Fairy Tales shows this well. (I want to watch it, but buying or streaming it in Korea seems impossible as of June 2024.)

Proper taxation of the superrich could address not only poverty but the climate crisis, biodiversity crisis, and other problems requiring humanity’s collective response. In short, states can do many good things with tax revenue.

Neoliberals call this killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. But simply fixing laws, rigorously preventing tax avoidance, and distributing more justly would mean almost no superrich people remained to be affected by limitarianism.

Would higher tax rates truly reduce the superrich’s motivation? According to T. Malleson’s Against inequality, there is no evidence for this claim. Nor is there evidence for the neoliberal claim that material gain is a fundamental motive inherent in human nature.

Chapter 8. Philanthropy is not the answer

Chuck Feeney anonymously donated almost his entire fortune, over $8B, until circumstances involuntarily made this public and brought widespread praise. Neoliberals praise such philanthropy, but we must not stop there.

First, before discussing donations, wealth accumulation must be morally justified. Entrepreneurs’ and the superrich’s tax avoidance reduces revenue, forcing others to pay more or leaving government unable to invest adequately in public services, reducing others’ welfare. Everyone suffers. (From this perspective, the example in The most good you can do—Matt Wage making huge sums through Wall Street arbitrage and donating generously—may not be particularly recommendable. Perhaps it is not right even from a consequentialist/utilitarian perspective. 🤔)

Philanthropic foundations funded by the superrich are often needed because government fails to do its job. Ninety of the world’s hundred largest foundations are in the US: 1) it adopted an economic system permitting abnormal wealth accumulation, and 2) government is not doing its job properly.

Conservatives advocating small government fail to recognize 1) markets are possible because of government and 2) much wealth they consider earned through their own efforts depends on social infrastructure. Mitt Romney says government support is unnecessary because people can borrow tuition money from parents, but not everyone has wealthy parents. They say government’s only aim is maximizing efficiency. Yet even on efficiency alone, small government is inappropriate. If individuals must protect themselves against risks, each saves more than necessary, reducing consumption. Pooling risks nationally (public insurance) is much more efficient.

The superrich’s belief in small government often rests on elitism and prejudice against the poor.

I am rich because I am intelligent and diligent → government is run by people elected by the masses rather than intelligent elites like me → it cannot be trusted.

Not everyone favoring foundations thinks this way. Without such prejudice, are their arguments sound? No. Philanthropic foundations are inherently undemocratic. According to R. Reich 2019, their operations are heavily influenced by large donors. Delegating government work to foundations ultimately weakens democracy and strengthens plutocracy.

Arguments in defense of foundations include:

Pluralism. Government has limitations, such as its inherently short-term orientation because of election cycles, so diverse foundations are needed to pursue plural goals. Objection: they need not originate in superrich donations; ordinary people can pool money. Moreover, superrich foundations are inherently plutocratic, as discussed.
Discovery. Foundations can undertake more experimental work that governments struggle to do. Bill Gates shares this view. But ordinary people can pool resources for experiments too, without risking domination by superrich wealth. Assuming foundations know which problems matter is also dangerous. The rich really need humility, especially effective altruism (EA). Some EA advocates even urge earning great wealth by any means and donating it (Chapter 1 of Peter Singer’s The most good you can do).

What should superrich people who want to do the right thing properly do?

First, minimize future harm and repair past harm. Ask whether they exploited workers, harmed residents/customers/the planet’s health, or used loopholes to reduce tax (Samsung, are you listening?).
Second, support structural reform: voting rights; bodies monitoring disinformation in the media; unions; educating workers about the need for unions; tax-justice organizations; and so on. Specific issues will vary by country.
Third, invest in beneficial projects rather than vanity projects. Morally, much of their money is not theirs. The Gates-Melinda foundation’s investment in health in poor countries is a good example. The space race of Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, and Richard Branson is a bad one.

Do people with under $10M have no obligations? This is where limitarianism’s ethical limit matters. People who live reasonably comfortably, even if not rich, have a moral obligation to help address wealth concentration. This includes many in the Global North and some well-off people in the Global South.

Chapter 9. The rich will benefit, too

A world realizing limitarianism would be more democratic, reward work fairly, handle disasters better, respond better to the climate crisis, and have better schools, hospitals, and other public facilities. Would it also benefit the superrich? The author firmly says yes.

First, because living ethically with morally indefensible money is difficult, limitarianism could give them an opportunity to live ethically too. The greatest benefit is the chance to live humanely.

Beyond morality, three personal reasons:

First, a widening wealth gap increases social/political instability and the likelihood of riots. Historically, serious inequality has never failed to produce unrest.
Second, personal unhappiness. Excessive wealth makes people unhappy through distorted relationships, disconnection from the “ordinary” world, and so on. Superrich children face problems including relationships with parents busy maintaining wealth and lack of patience arising from excessively affluent childhoods. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi found that acquiring substantial material goods made people very happy, but not the superrich. For them, time is an excessively expensive resource: even a little time with their children feels wasteful because they could earn enormous sums instead. They gradually become insensitive to pleasures such as pursuing happiness slowly.
Third, social safety nets. R. Sherman’s research suggests many superrich people consider wealth accumulation necessary against emergencies, and some seem genuinely anxious. But the solution is a national social safety net, not individual hoarding.

If people remain anxious despite so much money, why accumulate it? Capitalist society has stopped asking, but philosophers from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas asked this question. A good life knows contentment. Modern people have lost that wisdom because it conflicts with neoliberal capitalism’s imposed self-image: an endlessly desiring, self-centered consumer who can be happy alone while others suffer. But we can become better people. We must break neoliberal capitalism’s spell and imagine something better.

Chapter 10. The road ahead

Most people do not know how extreme the wealth gap is. M. Norton and Dan Ariely 2011 found that Americans thought the top 20% owned about 36% of total wealth and the bottom 20% about 11%. Reality: 84% for the top 20%, 0.1% for the bottom 20%. Studies in other countries reach similar conclusions. One reason people care little about redistribution is therefore ignorance of reality. (Oh… D. Ariely has repeatedly faced research-ethics and data-manipulation controversies, and here he is again.)

Another reason is equating limitarianism with communism. They differ, and the author is skeptical of communism. Government control of all production and distribution is neither possible nor ideal.

I do not see what capping individual wealth has to do with communist central planning. It is sad that opponents of limitarianism seem uninterested in serious discussion. Mainstream debate regrettably falls into a dichotomy: capitalism or communism.

We call US-like economic systems capitalism, but almost no pure capitalism exists. Governments own land and buildings, provide goods, and impose regulations. The problem, of course, is that government’s role has shrunk substantially since neoliberalism’s rise in the 1970s.

Neoliberalism reduces public welfare, privatizes public services, excessively deregulates, and gradually weakens government. Labor markets become “flexible,” but workers bear the risks while capitalists reap the benefits.

What should we do? Limitarianism is no panacea, but can offer proposals for economic design. Systems should prevent the wealth gap from exceeding certain limits, and wealth above certain levels should fund collective responses to the climate crisis and similar problems.

We must also embed public values in culture. Material income should not be the main incentive. Achievement, challenge, intrinsic enjoyment, and honor should take that role, with emphasis on everyone’s vulnerability and inability to live alone. Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos seem unlikely to do this.

What specific changes does limitarianism require?

First, dismantle neoliberal ideology at its foundations. It is limitarianism’s opposite. Neoliberalism claims technocratic approaches, rather than citizens’ deliberative democracy, can solve every problem. (This brings to mind Marc Andreessen’s Techno-optimist manifesto.)
Second, reduce segregation between classes. Integration allows empathy among people with different life experiences and stronger opposition to policies benefiting oneself while harming others. Government has a major role, including housing policies that reduce segregation.
Third, checks and balances on economic power. Most people consider these necessary for political power. It is interesting they still think differently about economic power, despite Adam Smith analyzing it centuries ago in The wealth of nations.
Fourth, strengthen government tax and fiscal systems. Taxation is central to the social contract, but the neoliberal era has riddled systems with loopholes, continually reduced staffing in relevant agencies, and failed to achieve effective international cooperation against avoidance. Tax justice remains distant under these conditions.
Fifth, confiscate dirty wealth and support reparations. Few would dispute confiscating criminal proceeds. But as discussed, “dirtiness” has degrees that require broader consideration.
Sixth, a fair international economic structure. Checks and balances on money’s power within a single country are insufficient; international checks and balances are needed.
Seventh, introduce maximum as well as minimum wages. Particularly to stop executives’ absurd pay. See S. Pizzigati 2008.
Finally, prevent intergenerational wealth transfers. Some philosophers propose abolishing inheritance outright; some scholars propose dramatically higher inheritance taxes. The author proposes capping inheritance and distributing the remainder equally among all young people.

The key? Wake up from the mantra “Greed is good, and there are no limits.”