Clarifying Misconceptions About Peter Singer

I frequently encounter misrepresentations in Korea of moral philosopher Peter Singer’s positions and the central arguments of Animal liberation. Korean authors introduce his views incorrectly, and these errors recur in CSAT preparation books, their sample questions and explanations, and some instructors’ lectures. I would like to correct several major misconceptions.

Is Singer’s animal liberation a matter of benevolence?

I often hear the mistaken claim that Singer says we should “show animals kindness and care.” But this attitude—paternalistic benevolence, in which superior humans bestow consideration on inferior animals, or sentimental compassion for poor animals—is precisely what Singer repeatedly criticizes throughout Animal liberation, from the preface to the final chapter.

The preface to the 1975 edition, for example, says that animal liberation has nothing to do with sentimental affection:

We do not “love” animals. We simply want them treated as the independent sentient beings they are, rather than as means to human ends…. This book makes no emotional appeal to sympathy for so-called cute animals…. There is no argument here that appeals to emotion alone without support from reason.

Chapter 6 again explains that he deliberately avoided an emotional approach:

I have appealed to reason rather than emotion or sentiment, not because I fail to appreciate the importance of kindness and feeling toward other animals, but because reason has a more universal and compelling appeal.

Singer also opposes the paternalistic idea that humans should take charge of animals’ lives and bestow care on them. In chapter 6, for instance, he answers the question of whether humans should eliminate all carnivorous animals to reduce suffering:

The short, simple answer is that once we abandon the attitude that humans have dominion over other species, we should stop interfering with them…. We should give up the role of tyrant, and stop playing God.

I suspect some of the misconception that Singer advocates “kindness and care” comes from Korean translations that turn his expressions into paternalistic or sentimental language. Comparing parts of Yeonamseoga’s 2012 revised, unabridged Korean edition with the fortieth-anniversary English edition, I found a consistent tendency to translate the original in this way.

Consider some examples. The Korean expressions below are rendered into English to show the contrast.

Korean translation: why the ethical principle underlying human equality requires extending kind consideration/care to animals on an equal basis. (p27)
Original: why the ethical principle on which human equality rests requires us to extend equal consideration to animals too

This is the subtitle of chapter 1. “Equal consideration,” one of the book’s most important expressions, would be better translated as dongdeung goryeo (동등 고려), but is sometimes rendered with baeryeo (배려), a word associated with considerate care. Equal consideration underlies the subsequent arguments and recurs throughout the book, yet the translation alternates between baeryeo and goryeo. Adding to the confusion, “care” in passages where Singer uses it critically is also translated as baeryeo: “This did not happen because scientists suddenly began to care more about animals” (p161).

Korean translation: Once, chickens were treated as individuals. (p185)
Original: Once, chickens were individuals.

The Korean adds “were treated as,” suggesting something bestowed on chickens; that expression is absent from the original. Similar expressions about receiving favorable treatment or benefits recur elsewhere. Here is another example.

Korean translation: Whatever the theoretical possibility of rearing animals without suffering, meat sold in butcher shops and supermarkets clearly comes from animals who were not treated as objects of care during their lives. (p279)
Original: Whatever the theoretical possibilities of rearing animals without suffering may be, the fact is that the meat available from butchers and supermarkets comes from animals who were not treated with any real consideration at all while being reared.

Here “consideration” becomes baeryeo, and “treated” an expression suggestive of favorable treatment, producing a strongly benevolent tone.

Sometimes the translation introduces care or a similar notion even though nothing corresponding to it appears in the original.

Korean translation: This is because care for humans and care for animals are not incompatible. (p373)
Original: For the truth is that there is no incompatibility here.

This could simply be translated as “In fact, there is no conflict between the two.” Neither the sentence nor the surrounding paragraph contains a word that needs to be translated as baeryeo, yet that is what appears.

Other words are also mistranslated in paternalistic or sentimental ways.

Korean translation: … leads to contempt for animals—and thus to poor treatment of them. (p386)
Original: … lead to disrespect - and hence mistreatment - for the animals.

Here “mistreatment,” meaning abuse or ill-treatment, becomes pudaejeop (푸대접), suggesting a failure of hospitality or proper attention—as though the remedy were to bestow better treatment.

Even a cursory comparison reveals these problems. They could easily make Singer sound paternalistic or sentimental.

I also noticed that “companion animal” is consistently translated as “pet” rather than “companion animal,” and that omitting words such as “may” or “perhaps” turns cautious conjectures into categorical assertions.

Does he stop short of full equality between humans and animals?

I also often encounter the misconception that Singer thinks human interests should take priority whenever they conflict with animal interests.

But Singer defines speciesism as discounting an animal’s equal or greater interests simply because it belongs to another species. “Humans always come first in a conflict” therefore contradicts his position. Animal liberation explains:

Like racists and sexists, … speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case.

The key word is greater. What Singer calls speciesism is overriding another being’s equal or greater interests solely because of species, not choosing the greater interest when the interests genuinely differ in magnitude. The principle does not require identical treatment regardless of the stakes. Choosing one side because of differing interests associated with capacities such as planning for the future is not speciesism. A concrete example appears in The Dog in the Lifeboat.

There is no doubt that Singer advocates equality for all sentient beings. Chapter 1 explains this in detail; its title is “All Animals Are Equal.” Equality, he argues, is a moral prescription about how to treat others, rather than a description of actual sameness. His point is that individuals are equal whether or not they have actual differences. His principle of equal consideration rests on that premise.

He does not, however, argue from utilitarianism that all life should be treated identically. Each individual has particular interests, and those interests deserve equal consideration. Different interests require different kinds of consideration. Considering “enough space to spread one’s wings freely” makes no sense for a being without wings, and declining to do so is not speciesism.

Does he accept meat-eating and focus on suffering rather than killing?

I sometimes hear that Tom Regan treats killing animals like murder, whereas Singer focuses only on suffering.

Yet Animal liberation repeatedly argues that we should stop all practices that use animals as means, including eating them. Ending meat consumption is presented as the most effective and urgent step. He also values gradual improvement because practical constraints mean that all meat-eating cannot end immediately.

Singer worries that moral perfectionism or an “all or nothing” attitude can prevent any real-world improvement. Consider his discussion of progress in animal experimentation in chapter 2:

These breakthroughs resulted from the work of people who found a way around the “all or nothing” mentality that had effectively meant “nothing” as far as the animals were concerned.

The revised, unabridged Korean edition translates this as the opposite, apparently omitting “a way round”:

These breakthroughs resulted from the efforts of people with an “all or nothing” mentality.

I also think the claim that Singer cares more about suffering than killing is a misunderstanding. Again, I suspect mistranslation contributes, though the original book’s organization can invite this reading too.

First, the translation. In response to the defense of meat-eating that more cows, chickens, and pigs come into existence because we eat them, so perhaps this benefits animals, the Korean edition makes Singer sound as though he rejected the argument in the first edition but withdrew his objection later:

In the first edition of this book, I did not accept this position…. But now I am not so sure. (p384)

This sounds like an admission that he is no longer sure whether “meat-eating brings more animals into existence, so isn’t that good?” is really a sophism.

The original, however, says:

In the first edition of this book, I rejected this view on the grounds that … . But now I am not so sure.

In context, he remains firmly opposed to the position, but is uncertain about the soundness of his earlier grounds and offers other arguments instead. The substantial discussion that follows explains why he still rejects the position. Unfortunately, the Korean translation is particularly awkward in this part.

Now consider how the book’s structure might suggest that suffering matters to him more than killing.

Most of Animal liberation does focus on suffering. Killing is mentioned briefly toward the end of chapter 1 and addressed fully only in chapter 6, the final chapter. But this is not because Singer considers it less important. Chapter 1 explains the postponement:

Explaining why killing is wrong is more complicated. I have deliberately set this issue aside and will continue to do so for a while, because, given the present tyranny of humans over other species, applying equal consideration to pain and pleasure alone already gives us sufficient grounds to condemn all the major forms of human abuse of other animals.

Does he favor welfare improvements over ending factory farming?

Some accounts contrast Singer, supposedly an animal-welfare advocate saying “Let us build nicer cages!”, with Regan, an animal-rights advocate replying “No! Abolish the cages!”

But Singer repeatedly calls for ending not just factory farming but meat-eating itself. He strongly urges vegetarianism or veganism as the most important step individuals can take toward that end, because suffering inflicted on nonhuman animals cannot be meaningfully reduced while meat-eating persists. Chapter 4 says:

As long as animals are raised in large numbers for food, there is effectively no way to avoid causing them substantial suffering. Even traditional rather than factory farming entails castration, separation from mothers and social groups, branding, transport to slaughterhouses, and slaughter.

Returning from factory farming to traditional husbandry would still leave a problem. The only solution Singer advocates is ending meat-eating altogether.

His position on welfare improvements can be summarized in three points.

First, they are good because they reduce suffering happening now. As explained above, he is especially wary of pursuing moral perfection at the expense of real change. The animal-liberation movement does not aim to insulate its participants from every wrong and make them morally perfect. Whether each participant can think “I am a good person” is not the point. Its aim is to reduce unjust oppression and suffering of nonhuman animals in practice. On avoiding leather shoes, fur, and other animal products, chapter 6 says:

I do not think consistency is the same as, or implies, strict adherence to a standard of absolute purity. The point of changing consumption habits is not to isolate oneself from evil but to reduce the economic incentive for animal exploitation and persuade others to join in.

Second, however “humane” its methods, speciesism remains speciesism and cannot be morally justified. Chapter 3 says:

This may be an enlightened and more humane form, but it remains speciesism. No government has yet challenged the idea that animals’ interests count for less than humans’. The issue is always “avoidable” suffering, meaning suffering avoidable while producing the same quantity of animal products without substantially increasing costs. The assumptions that humans may use animals as means, and breed and kill them to satisfy preferences such as eating flesh, remain unchallenged.

Third, in 2011, Singer wrote a foreword to a book about animal welfare. There he challenges the idea that we must choose between abolishing meat-eating and improving welfare:

Readers familiar with my views in Animal Liberation may be surprised that I wrote a foreword to a book called The Future of Animal Farming. Isn’t the animal-liberation movement about ensuring farming has no future? If equal consideration for nonhuman interests is a sound moral principle, shouldn’t we stop farming animals and all become vegan? … I have not withdrawn the position set out in Animal Liberation…. Yet despite the increase in vegetarians and vegans, animal suffering and death from meat production have increased faster…. With luck, perhaps 5 or 10 percent of the population will be vegan in ten or twenty years. Most people will still eat meat, however, and the number of animals suffering and being killed over that period will inevitably grow…. We must therefore also work to reduce suffering. Abolition and welfare improvement are not an either-or choice.

As noted, this is his consistent position. He warns against moral perfectionism and an “all or nothing” attitude that achieves no real-world difference.

Is Regan’s rights view more radical than Singer’s liberation argument?

The Megastudy 2020 CSAT Preparation: Social Studies—Life and Ethics workbook explains:

Regan can criticize Singer’s appeal to the capacity for pleasure and pain as too narrow a conception of moral consideration for animals. According to Regan, animals possess not only this capacity but also beliefs, desires, perception, memory, identity, and so on. (p23, Answers and Explanations)

This could suggest that Singer says animals possess only sentience, while Regan adds beliefs, desires, perception, memory, and identity. That interpretation gets it backwards.

Singer says all animals capable of pleasure or pain deserve moral consideration. Regan says that, in addition, they must possess beliefs, desires, perception, memory, identity, and so on to meet his criterion.

They are proposing criteria for which beings qualify for moral consideration, not simply describing which capacities animals have. Fewer conditions therefore include more beings. Singer’s criterion includes at least almost all vertebrates. Regan’s covered mentally normal mammals aged one or older in the 1983 first edition, expanding to birds in the preface to the 2004 revised edition.

Presented alone, that would be unfair to Regan: Singer offers sentience as a necessary and sufficient condition, while Regan’s conditions are sufficient. Nevertheless, Singer’s stated condition unquestionably includes more beings than Regan’s.

Next, consider misconceptions about their views of rights.

Some Korean high-school ethics textbooks briefly say Regan grants animals rights while Singer denies them. This too can mislead. Singer does say animals have no rights, but understanding this properly requires explaining that he also denies rights to humans in the same sense. This is a difference between deontology and utilitarianism. Singer does not ground moral consideration in rights, whether human or animal. If a being can feel pain or pleasure, it has interests, and those interests should receive equal consideration without discrimination.

Some CSAT instructors seem to repeat misleading accounts. For instance, instructor Han Jun-ho’s lecture calls Regan more radical, explaining that extending traditionally human rights to animals would be strong enough to permit marriage between humans and animals or grant animals voting rights. But saying animals have rights does not mean they have the same rights as humans. Chapter 8 of Regan’s Animal rights, human wrongs - An introduction to moral philosophy says:

Any view that entails that animals have the right to vote, to marry, and to change their citizenship is absurd. The rights view helps us understand why belief in animal rights does not have these absurd implications.

As noted earlier, Singer makes the same point in Animal liberation. Both agree that equal consideration for all sentient beings differs from granting identical rights to all of them.

Closing remarks

Singer criticizes paternalistic benevolence and sentimental compassion, seeks to appeal to reason, and argues for equal consideration of humans and animals—which is different from identical treatment. He calls for ending discriminatory oppression of animals in meat production, factory farming, experimentation, and other forms. Welfare improvements matter, but cannot by themselves abolish speciesism. Tom Regan, often presented as demanding more radical or fundamental change, sometimes appears more moderate or anthropocentric. Calling Regan an animal-rights theorist is appropriate, since his deontology rests on rights; calling Singer merely an animal-welfare theorist is not.

Misconceptions about Singer seem to arise from poor Korean translations, inadequate summaries in some high-school textbooks, their amplification by some CSAT workbooks and instructors, and one-sided criticisms by Regan and others. In particular, the impression that Singer advocates paternalistic or sentimental attitudes may stem entirely from the Korean translation.