# Utilitarianism: A very short introduction > A book by Katarzina de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer introducing utilitarianism's history, philosophical justification, major branches and objections, and practical applications. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory choosing the best consequences by impartially considering all beings' happiness and suffering. A book by and [Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Peter%20Singer.txt) introducing [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt)'s history, philosophical justification, major branches and objections, and practical applications. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory choosing the best consequences by impartially considering all beings' happiness and suffering. ## Terminology Some terms sound similar in Korean but are distinguished in the text. Conversely, some seemingly unrelated Korean expressions are similar in the original. I have tried to translate consistently. - **Utilitarianism and utility**: Utilitarianism adds "-ism" to utility. I wish the Korean translation used *hyoyongjuui*, built on the Korean word for utility. Its established name, *gongnijuui* (功利主義), seems to mean "placing foremost importance on benefit." I understand this benefit as translating both senses of "interest": welfare and preference. - **Gongni (功利) and gongni (公理; axiom)**: The former appears in utilitarianism's Korean name; the latter means an axiom in mathematics or logic. Both occur here, so they must be distinguished. - **Benefit and concern**: English uses "interest" for both, apparently creating confusion. They are sometimes distinguished as welfare interests and preference interests. - **Well-being**: Utilitarianism's goal. Utilitarianism is a form of ; when the consequences pursued are well-being, it is classified as utilitarianism. - **Happiness and pleasure, suffering and pain**: Happiness contrasts with suffering; pleasure with pain. Pleasure contributes to happiness, pain to suffering. ## Preface A central feature of [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) is that researchers do not merely establish theoretical foundations: they apply theory to increase happiness and reduce suffering. Utilitarians have criticized practices accepted by most contemporaries, such as , [sexism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Sexism.txt), and [speciesism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Speciesism.txt), and brought substantial change. Criticism has always existed too. Philosophers such as and , and writers such as , , , and criticized utilitarianism. It nevertheless remains widely influential. *('s criticism appears later. Since the book does not explain 's criticism, I looked it up. My understanding is this. Marx, a , explains ideas from material conditions rather than material phenomena from ideas. Human productive forces (labor, tools, etc.) determine relations of production (all relationships among people and between people and tools for production), from which economic systems emerge. This foundation generates ideas—ethics, law, institutions, religion—called the superstructure. Without changing the economic foundation, no ideas placed on it can fundamentally solve the problem. Thus, under , even with [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt), humans cannot bear situations requiring individual sacrifice to 'maximize total happiness.' It seems he means that only a foundation aligning individual and social interests allows utilitarianism or anything else to work. See [Marx: A very short introduction](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Marx%20-%20A%20very%20short%20introduction.txt) for more on Marxism. --ak)* asks "What ought I to do?"; asks "What ought we to do?" Utilitarianism offers intuitive answers to both: the right action brings the best consequences, maximizing the sum of happiness minus suffering for all affected beings. Some, however, argue that happiness and suffering are not the only standards for evaluating consequences. Such theories broadly constitute , of which utilitarianism is one form. *(Thinking about what "not this theory" is called helps clarify a theory's name. What is not consequentialism? A leading example is : roughly, right action follows given duties regardless of consequences. A deontologist opposes [speciesism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Speciesism.txt) because animals have rights and we have a "duty" to respect others' rights. A consequentialist opposes it because animals' well-being matters, and eliminating speciesism moves us toward the "good consequence" of well-being. --ak)* ## Chapter 1. Origins ### Ancient precursors Surviving records suggest the first person to advocate utilitarian-like ideas was (<490 BCE>–<403 BCE>) in China's Warring States period. Dominant thought valued duties, relationships, and traditions. Mozi argued that tradition cannot justify itself: we must weigh whether its benefits exceed its harms, considering everyone rather than only close relationships. Two utilitarian elements: weighing benefits and harms instead of simply following rules, and emphasizing impartiality by considering every human. Mozi was contemporary with India's , who also showed utilitarian tendencies, teaching compassion for all [sentient beings](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Sentient%20being.txt) to reduce one's own and others' suffering. A century later, in proposed pleasure and pain as criteria for good and evil. ### Early utilitarians Such ideas became popular in Europe in the . Opposing 's egoism, (1631–1718) argued that actions are not morally good unless "through their intrinsic nature they contribute to human happiness." (1671–1713) argued that the highest goodness was "studying the universal good, and doing our utmost to advance the interests of the whole world." "," often wrongly credited to Bentham, first appeared in 's (<1726>). Mid- Swiss-French Enlightenment philosopher and Italian jurist used similar expressions. encountered it through C.B.'s writing and adopted it as utilitarianism's slogan. He was also influenced by (1733–1804) and (1711–76). Bentham was pivotal in developing utilitarianism, but clergyman popularized it through (1785), arguing we should follow God's wish for everyone's happiness. 's *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793) is another early utilitarian work. *(Godwin was feminist philosopher 's husband and the father of , feminist, vegetarian, and author of . --ak)* ### Bentham: Founder of modern utilitarianism developed utilitarianism into a systematic ethical theory and basis for social reform. A prodigy, he began law at at twelve, soon abandoning it to write on legal reform. He associated with prominent people including , 's father. From around <1776>, when he began using "," he concentrated on practicing utilitarianism. He later regretted the phrase because it suggested slight happiness for 51% could justify terrible misery for 49%. In 1780 Bentham completed , explicitly presenting utilitarian theory, but published it about nine years later. This was characteristic: he published sixteen volumes in life, yet left 36 million unpublished words—about eighty volumes—of which thirty-three had appeared by <2016>. His judicial and prison reforms are also famous, especially the . Now notorious as a design for systematic privacy invasion, one original aim was to let the chief supervisor prevent guards from abusing prisoners. Between the <1770s> and <1820s>, he wrote on sexual freedom, arguing was special because rich and poor alike could enjoy it, and opposing punishment of . He left these writings unpublished, perhaps judging them unacceptable to the public. Could he have known these ideas would barely begin gaining acceptance 150 years later? At twenty-one he willed his body to anatomical research. At the time, all human dissection except that of executed criminals was reportedly illegal. He later added instructions to preserve and display his dissected body, now exhibited at the University of London. *(Preservation of the head failed; it was replaced with wax. --ak)* His will also allowed the display case to be moved for visits by utilitarian friends. Accordingly, this book's authors ( and [Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Peter%20Singer.txt)) dined with 's corpse to mark 's bicentenary. ### John Stuart Mill and Harriet's daughter Helen Taylor Mill's father met Bentham when Mill was two, becoming his friend and disciple. Home-educated rather than schooled, Mill learned Greek at three and Latin at eight. By fifteen he had read most classics in their original languages and studied mathematics, logic, science, and economics to an advanced level. Only then did he read Bentham, describing him as a "different being" from earlier scholars who opened a new age in intellectual history. At twenty-four Mill met , whom he married twenty years later. Her influence was immense: he said his writings were effectively coauthored with her. Mill's most famous work was , but his utilitarian books include (1859), (<1861>), and (1869). In and , he explicitly endorsed classical [hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt), yet some claims seem to depart from it, generating debate about his position. Chapter 3 examines this. criticizes discrimination and calls for "perfect equality." Mill credited and her daughter with greatly influencing it. Taylor also principally authored , published under Mill's name. *( is a renowned early [feminist](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Feminism.txt) work. Mill argues that social relations subordinating one sex to another are inherently wrong and a chief obstacle to human progress, and must be replaced by complete equality. --ak)* Mill sought legislation in <1867>, but strong opposition defeated it. Britain granted it only sixty years later. His attempt to grant married women property rights also failed, though that passed two years after he lost his seat. ### Henry Sidgwick: Author of "the best book on ethics" (1838–<1900>), a student and professor at Trinity College, Cambridge, wrote his most important work first: . He continually refined it, dying while revising the sixth edition. The posthumously revised seventh is now standard. It compares methods of ethical decision-making: , , and [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt). Sidgwick was strongly influenced by 's and 's [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt). His book is more rigorous and broader than Mill's, but less read because it is very long and less elegantly written. praised it as "the first truly academic work in , systematically comparing moral conceptions." Sidgwick's comparative approach became standard in philosophical writing. He also lectured to women and rented accommodation for them, paving the way for women's admission to Cambridge. His wife excelled in mathematics and coauthored papers with physics Nobel laureate . His student (1873–1958) accepted that right action produces the best consequences, but rejected pleasure or happiness as the only intrinsic goods, adding friendship and appreciation of beauty. This is now called [ideal utilitarianism or pluralist consequentialism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt). Moore's greatest contribution was founding through , examining ethical concepts such as "good" rather than normative ethics. His influence made metaethics prominent for a time, but revived from the <1970s>. ## Chapter 2. Justification ### Bentham's justification Answering ethical questions and persuading others requires justifying views, not merely stating them. What counts as justification depends on one's understanding of ethics. Starting from self-evident first principles, like 's "," is foundationalism. Testing agreement with human moral judgments, as does, is . In , Bentham says a foundational principle explaining everything cannot explain itself, so he tries indirect rather than direct proof. He assumes many naturally accept utility; even dissenters, after considering all possible objections, would ultimately accept it. and [Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Peter%20Singer.txt) consider Bentham's explanation excessively compressed. More importantly, his criticism of nonutilitarians also challenges utilitarianism itself. He asks what motivates following a nonutilitarian principle, but must answer the same question. He says humans are governed solely by pleasure and pain—their own, not others'. Yet [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) demands maximizing everyone's pleasure and minimizing everyone's pain. Why would people governed by their own pleasure and pain follow a principle concerned with everyone's? ### Mill's proof Mill's is reportedly the most-read textbook after 's *Ethics*. His justification is the most discussed, but not necessarily best: its ambiguity and controversy make it suitable for student debate. It shares Bentham's limitation. Mill sought judgments of right and wrong through induction rather than intuition. Since everyone desires happiness, he argued, it may be the ultimate end. Two problems: - **Problem 1**: Addicts desire drugs, but are drugs desirable? Not everything humans desire deserves to be desired. - **Problem 2**: points out that Mill commits what calls the [naturalistic fallacy](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Naturalistic%20fallacy.txt). "Everyone naturally desires happiness" alone cannot establish "pursuing happiness is right." ### Sidgwick's proof Unlike Mill, Sidgwick believed objective [axioms](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Axiom.txt) could be found. sought objective, self-evident moral axioms. He concluded utilitarianism was highly plausible, but found a formidable rival and no grounds proving egoism wrong and [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) alone right. An axiom is a foundation valid without further grounds, making Sidgwick a philosophical intuitionist. Unlike most intuitionists, however, he argues that such axioms, though self-evident because independent of other principles, are less obvious on close examination than assumed. "Do not lie," for example, seems self-evident but has many exceptions. Is it wrong not to tell a terminally ill child the diagnosis, instead saying recovery is possible? Is attributing Christmas presents to Santa wrong? Every seemingly obvious moral commonplace needs deeper explanation. Utilitarianism's explanation—that all these serve a greater good—has greater explanatory power than competing theories, he argues. Believing moral theory explains and systematizes intuitions resembles 's , but differs. Reflective equilibrium assumes the true theory best explains intuitive judgments. rejects that assumption, seeking more abstract principles. He proposes four conditions for self-evident abstract principles: 1. The proposition's terms must be clear and precise. 2. Careful reflection must establish confidence in its self-evidence. 3. Propositions must be mutually consistent. 4. If someone of equal judgment disagrees, reduce confidence, allow for personal error, and remain neutral at least temporarily. Sidgwick offers three principles satisfying these constraints: 1. **Justice**: Treat similar cases similarly. 2. **Prudence**: Consider all moments of life (present, future, etc.) impartially. 3. **Benevolence**: Consider universal good, not merely one's own. Benevolence, he argues, underlies utilitarianism. [Hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt) additionally requires arguing that only pleasure or happiness is intrinsically good. He addresses this separately (introduced in Chapter 3). He also identifies as satisfying the four constraints while conflicting with benevolence. Since the two point in different directions, he considered his attempt to establish morality's rational foundation unsuccessful. ### Harsanyi's argument from rational choice under conditions of ignorance (1920–2000) shared the economics Nobel with for . He argued that a rational egoist ignorant of how a choice affects their own interests would maximize average interests, thereby maximizing their expected utility. *(I understand this as follows. If choosing among different-sized cakes without knowing how many slices I will receive, which should I choose? As a rational egoist valuing my own interests, probably the largest: however many slices I get, each will be larger. Even without knowing my percentage, choosing a larger pie is rational. --ak)* Ironically, this argument became famous through using it against [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) in [A theory of justice](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/A%20theory%20of%20justice.txt)'s . Rawls says rational egoists would prioritize improving the worst-off person's interests rather than average interests. Chapter 4 returns to this; here the authors simply call it the weakest point of Rawls's theory. Harsanyi later formalized his argument, deriving utilitarian ethics from a few restricted assumptions about maximizing individual interests. Some assumptions, however, are contestable rather than self-evidently true. ### Smart's argument from attitudes and feelings (1920–2012) published . Philosophers then considered moral judgments expressions of attitudes or feelings, neither true nor false. Philosophy concerned reason and argument, so ultimate ethical principles seemed beyond its scope. Smart nevertheless argued foundational principles could be examined philosophically. Rather than "prove" utilitarianism true, he sought to "persuade" us to adopt it. A moral principle might demand following rules despite cruel consequences. On philosophers' account, such principles cannot be proved true or false and merely express attitudes or feelings; that principle therefore expresses cruelty, whatever its truth. We have no reason to accept it. We should adopt (generally [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt)) rather than . This persuasion requires someone who at least values good consequences for all humans or all [sentient beings](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Sentient%20being.txt). Without that attitude, the strategy is pointless. *(Must you already be a consequentialist to be persuaded of consequentialism? Or does this argument philosophically support utilitarianism for people already utilitarian who consider foundational morality beyond philosophy, rather than persuade nonutilitarians? --ak)* ### R.M. Hare's universal prescriptivism (<1919>–2002), like , considered moral judgments neither true nor false. Unlike Smart, he also denied they were attitudes or feelings, regarding them as prescriptions, a kind of imperative. Prescriptions, though not truth-evaluable, admit logical rules. "Close every door" contradicts "Open the back door"; both cannot be followed. Philosophical/logical reflection is therefore possible. But consistency alone cannot yield an argument for utilitarianism. Borrowing 's **principle of justice** (judging similar cases similarly), Hare adds that moral judgments must rest on universal properties. "You must not evade taxes" must imply "Neither must I." Moral judgments must be universalizable. To determine whether I can accept one as a prescription, I must try considering whether it maximally satisfies every affected individual's preferences and desires from their perspectives. This is . Smart and Hare both defended utilitarianism without self-evident moral truths. Smart's persuasion assumes a particular subjective attitude in the listener. Hare assumes all moral language implies universalizability, thereby requiring equal consideration of everyone's preferences. ### Interim summary Positions examined so far: - and : Consider everyone equally. - : Count one person's good as equally good for anyone else. - : Choice theory under ignorance - : A demand for benevolence - : Consider everyone affected by an action. All regard utilitarianism as the best understanding and application of the Golden Rule's underlying insight. Similar principles at the heart of ethics across cultures are probably no coincidence; this affinity supports utilitarianism. ### Greene: Defending utilitarianism by attacking its opponents' principles Since the <2000s>, arguments have defended utilitarianism through research on moral judgment. Caution is needed against invalidly deriving values from facts. ([Naturalistic fallacy](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Naturalistic%20fallacy.txt) and [moralistic fallacy](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Moralistic%20fallacy.txt).) Experimental psychologist and neuroscientist showed scientific research could support utilitarianism without deriving ought solely from is. Two : - **Switch**: A Y-shaped track. Inaction kills five; switching the track kills only one. - **Footbridge**: A stranger with a heavy backpack leans against a bridge railing. I am too light to stop the train by jumping, but pushing the stranger would stop it and save five. The stranger dies. People intervene in Switch but resist intervening in Footbridge. The traditional explanation distinguishes killing one as a side effect of saving five from using one as a means. But consider: - **Loop**: Like Switch, but the Y's branches reconnect before five people. The left branch is clear; someone is tied to the right. Inaction lets the train pass left and kill five. Switching right kills the tied person and stops the train. Most choose as in Switch, so the traditional explanation is incomplete. Greene's research found greater activation in Switch and activation in Footbridge. He suspected the latter's direct physical violence mattered; studies over the past decade supported this. It is called the [dual-process theory](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Dual-process%20theory%20of%20moral%20psychology.txt). Greene describes 1) an automatic mode, fast and emotional, and 2) a manual mode rationally weighing consequences. Most everyday situations activate automatic mode; evolutionarily unfamiliar situations call for manual mode. To test this hypothesis, he devised "Remote Footbridge." - **Remote Footbridge**: Like Footbridge, but I am elsewhere. A trapdoor lets me remotely drop the person from the bridge. Willingness to act more than doubled, from 31% in Footbridge to 63% in Remote Footbridge. Whether one kills by directly pushing or remotely should not affect moral permissibility. Readers agreeing also agree that many trolley judgments are influenced by irrelevant factors. Greene cautions against concluding all automatic moral judgments deserve suspicion. Some are products of [evolution](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Evolution.txt), acquired through millions of years of trial and error. *(This connects with 's . --ak)* Evolutionarily novel situations, however, warrant doubt about automatic responses. Most automatically condemn "adult siblings having penetrative sex with perfect ," but contraception is evolutionarily novel, making that response questionable. *(The original version I recall: 1) adult siblings, 2) double protection with and correctly used , 3) agreeing to tell no one, 4) becoming closer siblings afterward, 5) never repeating it. Is their sex immoral? --ak)* Even where well-evolved adaptations are expected, automatic responses can be inappropriate. Evolution optimizes , not happiness or moral knowledge. The following discussion criticizes existing nonutilitarian arguments. considered wrong because it makes oneself a means ([objectifies](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Objectification.txt) oneself). Most today would laugh, but traditional society accepted this. criticizes "intuition chasing" in many nonutilitarian philosophies, including Kant's . Those endorsing retributivism and harsher punishment, for example, rely more on automatic responses than conscious reasoning. Explaining , says moral theory, like science, needs evidence: intuitive moral judgments rather than experimental data. Compare theory and intuitions, refining explanations or questioning some judgments as "observational errors." Repeated adjustment produces reflective equilibrium. But if is right, moral intuitions should not determine theory. At least, their reliability as moral evidence must be calibrated through evidence of their evolution. *(Particular care is needed here. Reading this as testing whether intuitions evolved adaptively and remain suited to would commit the [naturalistic fallacy](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Naturalistic%20fallacy.txt). --ak)* Greene's research shows the need for rational reflection over emotional automaticity. But must that reflection be [utilitarian](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt)? What if 's universal benevolence is also an evolved automatic response? The authors consider this unlikely: [selection](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Natural%20selection.txt) would eliminate rather than favor it. Evolution favors altruism benefiting individuals, relatives (), or small groups exchanging benefits ([Reciprocal altruism](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Reciprocal%20altruism.txt)). *(This is inadequate in addressing only and [reciprocal altruism](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Reciprocal%20altruism.txt). The [handicap principle](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Handicap%20principle.txt) or permits much broader altruism to evolve. Has Singer discussed this elsewhere? Unfortunately, his understanding of seems stuck at this limitation since (<1981>). --ak)* ## Chapter 3. What should we maximize? ### The classical view , , and are [hedonistic utilitarians](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt). Only pleasure or happiness has positive intrinsic value; only pain or suffering negative intrinsic value. This does not deny that pain can lead to good: it may have positive instrumental value. 's criticism overlooks this. Pleasure as the sole intrinsic value was accepted from through Roman times, but not during the subsequent 1,500 years of dominance. Objections always existed. Many distinguish pleasures pigs share—eating and sex—from refined pleasures such as opera. replied that quality matters as well as quantity: the context of "." The principal objection is that introducing qualities such as refinement or intellectuality adds intrinsic values beyond pleasure, abandoning hedonism. Two options: reject qualitative distinctions and retain , or adopt [pluralist consequentialism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt). ### The experience-machine thought experiment In <1974>, proposed the against [hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt). Connect your brain and receive any desired experience—reading, friendship, anything. Would you use it? Nozick says most would refuse: something beyond inner experience matters, and we want real friends, not merely the feeling of friendship. Many accept this as refuting . (*Expecting a rebuttal, I looked one up: from , discussed in Chapter 2. See "Counterarguments" in Wikipedia's [Experience machine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experience_machine). In brief, resistance is automatic, so a small change to the should alter responses. Greene's version:* > *You awaken in a hospital room. A woman in white (why a woman? Sexist?) explains it is 2659 and you have used an experience machine for decades. Every ten years, users awaken to choose whether to continue; your ten years are up. Continuing erases this interruption and returns you to the machine's world. Your lovers, friends, and precious experiences are all there. Would you stop?* *I probably wouldn't. --ak*) ### Preference utilitarianism developed preference to explain utility. Choosing a mandarin over an equally priced apple shows preference at that moment, though eating it may bring regret. Whether preference-based choices yield pleasure does not matter. Economic utility and preference-utilitarian utility resemble each other but differ: utilitarianism does not require "observable choices revealing true preferences." In Chapter 2, rejected objective moral truths, treating moral judgments as universalizable prescriptions based on personal preferences and desires, and endorsed . Coauthor [Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Peter%20Singer.txt) long supported it too, from skepticism about objective moral truth. Unlike [hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt), preference utilitarianism avoids the objection: pleasure cannot satisfy my preference that it be real. But offers two objections. - **The altruistic drug dealer**: A dealer freely supplies addictive drugs providing neither pleasure nor side effects. Addicts satisfy preferences by taking them, so preference utilitarianism calls the dealer benevolent. - **The stranger on the train**: A neighboring passenger shares future hopes, which you sincerely support. Never meeting or influencing each other again, their dreams nonetheless come true without your knowledge, satisfying your preference. Has your life really improved? *(This seems a rejoinder to preference utilitarianism's response to the experience machine: exposing the oddity of valuing actual desire-satisfaction even without knowing it occurred. --ak.)* Other questions arise. values present and future desires; what about past ones? If a lifelong requests a priest to repent before dying, should we comply or respect earlier clear-minded desires and refuse? Dead people's preferences complicate matters further. If your desired epitaph appears after death, does your happiness increase? How differs this from **the stranger at the station**—a desire unknowably fulfilled after death versus during life? Are desires formed through impaired thinking or insufficient information, as with the dying atheist, good to satisfy? Is mistaken revenge based on misunderstanding good because it satisfies desire? Some respond that only well-informed, deliberated preferences count. But suppose a believer asks you to wake them early for Sunday church. Knowing God does not exist, you decline. May your evidence and reflection override their preference? The greatest weakness is evil desires. If someone strongly prefers evil after thorough evidence and reflection, should value it equally with other strong preferences? Some say yes. Others, including , require "reasonable" preferences. But assessing reasonableness is generally seen as changing a desire-based theory into a different theory about objective good. ### Pluralist consequentialism [Hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt) is vulnerable to the . avoids that but faces further problems. A third option is [ideal utilitarianism or pluralist consequentialism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt). Unlike [hedonistic utilitarians](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt), pluralists recognize intrinsic values beyond pleasure: knowledge, truth, beauty, justice, equality, freedom. Unlike , they regard these as valuable regardless of individual preferences. Some see them as constituents of well-being, others as independent. Utilitarianism calls actions right for best consequences, understood as well-being: pluralists whose values constitute well-being remain utilitarians; those recognizing values independent of it are consequentialists without being utilitarians. The latter divide again: values derived from conscious beings, or values existing independently of them. The distinctions, briefly: - ****: Fulfilling duties matters. - ****: Consequences matter. - **[Utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt)**: Consequences matter, understood as well-being. - **[Hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt)**: Consequences are well-being; its only intrinsic values are pleasure and pain. - ****: Consequences are well-being; its intrinsic value is satisfying desires and preferences, which need not produce pleasure. - **[Ideal utilitarianism or pluralist consequentialism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt)**: Consequences are well-being; several intrinsic values affect it. - **Nonutilitarian consequentialism**: Consequences matter; several intrinsic values exist independently of well-being. - **Pluralist consequentialism 1**: Consequences matter; intrinsic values independent of well-being exist because [sentient beings](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Sentient%20being.txt) exist. - **Pluralist consequentialism 2**: Consequences matter; intrinsic values independent of well-being matter regardless of [sentient beings](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Sentient%20being.txt)' existence. Diagram: `nb-cell:chart` [Pluralist consequentialism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt) claims realizing intrinsic values can improve well-being even if individuals do not care about them. Evaluating this requires asking what intrinsic value means. defends in , calling freedom vital to well-being. This might imply freedom intrinsically contributes independently of happiness. But Mill calls utility ethics' ultimate standard, explaining it through happiness or pleasure; reading freedom and other plural values as instrumental is therefore more reasonable. Next, **pluralist consequentialism 1**, recognizing intrinsic values independent of well-being. First, what criteria determine the list? Second, how should conflicts among values be resolved? Both questions are difficult. [Classical (hedonistic) utilitarians](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt) call pluralists victims of illusion: they value knowledge, justice, and equality because they improve society, yet want them declared intrinsic for fear governments would otherwise trade them for trivial, short-term, individual benefits. ### Value beyond sentient beings The third [pluralist consequentialist](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt) position (**pluralist consequentialism 2**) recognizes intrinsic value without [sentient beings](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Sentient%20being.txt). , for example, considered a beautiful world better than an ugly one even without observers. He later retracted this, denying intrinsic value independent of consciousness. Since the , some environmentalists claim wilderness and biodiversity intrinsically matter regardless of consciousness. Yet concern for plant extinctions and rare animals suggests that, more than individual suffering, they have ourselves, future humans, or other conscious beings in mind, as with cultural heritage. Their values are therefore instrumental, not intrinsic. ### Intrinsic value: The discussion so far Resistance to the strongly challenged [hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt). survives but must choose between accepting evil preferences and censoring preferences. [Pluralist consequentialists](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt)' proposed values turn out instrumental. Reconsider the machine hedonistically. Does aversion arise from intuitions based on real-life experience, frightening movie images, worry about abandoning one's life, distrust of machines, reluctance to leave loved ones, or a preference for reality over illusion? That preference is an evolutionary product difficult to defend rationally. Would you stop if told you already inhabit the machine? Experiments found most unwilling even when told their present lives were fake. If any of those possibilities substantially causes aversion, [classical utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt)'s answer—maximize pleasure—remains defensible. ### What is pleasure? Whether pleasure is the sole intrinsic value, as [hedonistic utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt) says, or one among many, as pluralists say, we must examine what it is and how it relates to happiness. , films, sex, and many activities produce pleasure. What is common? One position finds nothing except our attitude of wanting experiences to continue. Another finds a shared "feeling tone." Both have strengths and weaknesses. - **Attitude** explains why pleasure improves well-being without identifying common experiential qualities: pleasure is what we want to keep feeling, so improves well-being. - **Feeling tone** fits neuroscience better. distinguishes wanting from pleasure. Motivation and pleasure are separate; neuroscientists liken pleasure to a gloss over sensation, resembling the feeling-tone account. Separately, are pleasure and happiness identical, as [classical utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Hedonistic%20utilitarianism.txt) claims? Classical utilitarians often treat happiness as accumulated large and small pleasures. But happiness is closer to a psychological condition, orientation, or disposition. Dispositions matter because they lead somewhere: a disposition to help matters because it produces helping. If happiness is a disposition, its value may lie in the positive feelings it produces rather than itself. Happiness and pleasure present many research questions, all important to utilitarians. *(The end of Chapter 3 on these topics feels like a poorly organized digression. --ak)* ## Chapter 4. Objections ### Does utilitarianism encourage immoral actions? 's contains a famous argument against [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt). In brief: - **Premise 1**: If utilitarianism is true, it tells us which actions are right and wrong. - **Premise 2**: If torturing and killing an innocent child is the only way to make everyone else happy, utilitarianism calls it right. - **Premise 3**: Torturing and killing an innocent child is always wrong. - **Conclusion**: Utilitarianism is wrong. Many objections share this structure. Rebutting it requires rejecting premise 2 or 3. , one strategy against premise 2, appears in Chapter 5. Here the authors consider standard, act-utilitarian responses. First, merely saying "hypothetically suppose so" without explaining how torturing and killing a child makes everyone happy is unfair. Such a world would differ greatly from ours; judgments about its morality need not apply here. offered a more plausible example in <1957>. After a white woman suffers a sexual crime and the culprit remains uncaught, white men plan to kill unspecified Black men. Framing one Black man could limit death to him alone. Should a [utilitarian](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) sheriff do so? A modern version: four hospitalized patients each need a different organ to survive. Should a [utilitarian](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) doctor kill one healthy patient and transplant organs to save four? *(An example in 's . --ak)* Reflection makes these difficult to justify utilitarianly. Can we be certain the culprit will never confess, exposing the innocent's death? Would conveniently dying patients not arouse suspicion? Were no alternatives available? Both also profoundly betray professional duties and public expectations. People learning of the hospital practice would avoid treatment even when ill, causing grave harm. Even a tiny discovery risk may be too consequential, making these actions likely contrary to [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt). Utilitarians cannot completely exclude premise 2, only call such circumstances—torturing and killing a child making everyone else happy—extremely unlikely. If they did occur, could premise 3 be challenged? Rejecting premise 3 conflicts with intuition. But recall 's [dual-process theory](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Dual-process%20theory%20of%20moral%20psychology.txt) discussed in Chapter 3. Premise 2 describes extraordinarily rare circumstances where automatic responses work poorly, lowering confidence in our automatic endorsement of premise 3. Those considering some actions so self-evidently wrong they need no reflection will be unsatisfied. Most share such intuitions, but as Chapter 3 showed, they are not invariably reliable or justifiable moral principles. ### How can utility be measured? Measuring my happiness and comparing or aggregating it with others' is another major objection to [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt). In 1881, 's student attempted a . First, quantify pleasure: equalize pleasures A and B precisely, then gradually increase A until just preferred. The difference is one unit of pleasure, the "just perceivable increment." *(The terminology and timing suggest borrowing psychology's . --ak)* The attempt was abandoned as impractical. laureate recently revived interest, asking participants to record numerical ratings of current positive experience on phones at random moments. These cannot compare individuals but allow comparisons of one person's relative happiness. Health economists use (QALYs). Suppose a leaves twenty expected years untreated. Would you accept a cure shortening that to ten? Fifteen? Such comparisons measure how much a reduces quality of life. Accepting 's equal importance of individuals permits adding or multiplying QALYs across people. Critics note that recently diagnosed, long-term, and unaffected people may judge the same illness differently. Still, policy must be decided, so using QALYs is better than not. The UK's NICE, for example, recommends annual health budgets using them. Although Bentham's equal consideration permits combining QALYs, whether one person's QALY equals another's remains unclear. lets us 'observe' pain or pleasure, but similar brain states may not mean similar subjective . Measurement difficulty is not unique to [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt): everyone must sometimes estimate decisions' effects, and utilitarians and others can err. Those using available information to estimate as well as possible should not be blamed merely for error. *(This accords with 's central argument. --ak)* Utility can be difficult to measure, but many actions' best consequences are obvious and generally commonsensical. Sometimes conclusions challenge common sense. *(Abolishing , [feminism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Feminism.txt), animal liberation, and exemplify utilitarians challenging their eras' common sense. --ak)* ### Is utilitarianism too demanding? Traditional morality emphasizes what not to do; utilitarianism requires doing what yields best consequences. Hence the objection of excessive demands: "Taking a holiday is immoral when the money could fund a charity providing malaria vaccinations." The authors offer two replies: - **Gentle reply**: Holidays prevent , supporting long-term good. Still, honest people must admit they do insufficient good. - **Hard reply**: Demands may seem excessive because the world's problems and wealth disparities are so great. Utilitarians distinguish right actions from actions deserving praise/blame. Scalar utilitarianism treats actions as more or less right, not simply right or wrong. Donating even ten won more becomes slightly more right. See [Is utilitarianism too demanding](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Is%20utilitarianism%20too%20demanding.txt) for details. ### Does utilitarianism urge us to disregard special obligations? Is saving two strangers' children instead of one's own child right? 's utilitarian contemporary initially said yes, then changed after fierce criticism and developing a special relationship with . Special relationships enhance happiness and kindness toward others, making them compatible with [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt), he argued. calls such partiality "." Utilitarians should not condemn it, while also praising the few who overcome it. ### Does utilitarianism ignore the separateness of persons? argues that accepting lesser present suffering to avoid greater future suffering is right for oneself, but imposing lesser suffering on one person to spare greater suffering to another is problematic. He criticizes [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) for disregarding individual separateness. Yet acknowledged separateness as "real and fundamental," hence could not dismiss (Chapter 2). Nor do utilitarians infer interpersonal trade-offs merely from individuals' ability to exchange present and future suffering. Rawls's criticism is therefore unfair. Recognizing separateness and allowing utility trade-offs are independent. Most people recognize it while accepting heavier on the rich for welfare. Another reading is that utilitarians regard people as of pleasure, expendable if pleasure transfers elsewhere. But [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) does not separate pleasure from subjects: pleasure matters only because subjects exist. The criticism is therefore unfair. *( repeated it for at least twenty-five years despite rebuttals, showing some intellectual dishonesty. --ak)* Another objection prohibits adding or subtracting individual pleasures/pains. Suppose A and B are trapped in a collapsed building. Saving both requires breaking a structure, severing B's toe. Saving only B preserves it. Most would save A too at the cost of B's toe. Recognizing individual separateness and aggregating pleasure and pain are distinct questions. A reading prohibits using humans as means. But if saving A requires using B's foot as a tool, severing B's toe, should A be left to die? ### Distributing utility Suppose only A, B, and C exist, with two possible utility distributions: - **Option 1**: 5:5:5 - **Option 2**: 15:1:0 Should Option 2 be preferred because its total is higher? If units were money, prefer Option 1 (). But utility already accounts for , unlike money. It also incorporates B and C's envy of A, so Option 2 genuinely has greater total happiness. Diminishing marginal utility partly grounds belief in equality's superiority. Today's extreme income inequality gives [utilitarians](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) ample reason to seek equality—provided total happiness does not decline. *(I understand that, except for [ideal utilitarians](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt), they seek equality not for intrinsic value but to increase total happiness, given extreme inequality and happiness's . --ak)* Utilitarians differ from over equality's intrinsic value. Equality need not be egalitarians' sole value: 3:3:3 is more equal than 10:4:4, but the latter's much greater happiness could make it preferable. Intrinsic equality nevertheless creates [pluralist consequentialism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Pluralist%20consequentialism.txt)'s problem from Chapter 3: further principles must compare happiness and equality. ## Chapter 5. Rules evaluates individual acts' consequences. contrasts with it, justifying actions in two stages: 1. Does the action follow a rule? 2. Is that rule morally justified—does near-universal compliance produce the best consequences? Rule utilitarianism avoids Chapter 4's sheriff/doctor problems by readily justifying rules like "Public officials must obey the law" and "Doctors must not intentionally harm patients." The authors object that , unlike , sometimes blocks best consequences. Suppose rule R works best 99% of the time, not in the remaining 1%. Insisting on R in that 1%, despite ample reflection and no grounds for biased judgment, is "superstitious rule worship." *(Earlier the authors rejected applying conclusions from unrealistic situations to reality. This feels somewhat similar. Can an 'unbiased' human exist? --ak)* Rules could be refined, but accumulating exceptions eventually enumerates individual cases as though no rules exist. Defenders might demand rules simple enough for children. But what if complexity is necessary? The authors introduce the hypothetical ticking-bomb scenario: > A terrorist has planted a downtown, set to explode in two hours, and is captured. Should we them for its location? The prohibits torture under all circumstances, since even tiny exceptions invite expansion. accept no exceptionless rules. Make the scenario more extreme: fanatics seize a nation's nuclear facilities, planning humanity's slow death through radiation to bring the Messiah's return. Torturing the leader is the only option. Should we refrain? The authors say torture is required here. ### Keeping it secret We must choose one of two positions: 1. No torture even if humanity dies. 2. Permit torture in certain situations despite the risk of its expansion. offers a third: exceptional rules kept secret. Where simple rules generally work and complex rules handle exceptions, the public could receive simple rules while a few capable of understanding and judging complex ones administer those. These few must naturally follow [utilitarian](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) impartiality, striving for everyone's best consequences. Today this is criticized as politically inappropriate, , and imperialist. ### Is utilitarianism self-effacing? Philosophers distinguish [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt)'s explanation of rightness (maximizing well-being) from its action guidance (maximize everyone's affected pleasure). A utilitarian might accept the explanation yet recommend rather than directly maximizing pleasure as the guide. A theory sometimes recommending other theories is "partially self-effacing," not thereby impractical. If not following utilitarianism sometimes maximizes utility, telling people not to follow it then is following utilitarianism. Utilitarianism has paradoxes, especially 's elitism. Sometimes another theory may therefore be preferable, ideally with utilitarian grounds for following it. ## Chapter 6. Utilitarianism in action Practical [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) focuses more on suffering than happiness. Food, housing, and medicine help hungry, cold, sick people; after basic needs are met, increasing happiness is harder to understand. Another philosophical reason is asymmetry between suffering and happiness. (Chapter 6 adopts hedonistic utilitarianism, but slight changes adapt it to other forms.) This does not mean suffering matters more. Taking a state of neither suffering nor happiness as zero, if maximum happiness is 100 and maximum suffering 1,000, there is an asymmetry between them. Policy is difficult because reducing one person's suffering often increases another's. Easy utilitarian gains therefore lie where much suffering can be reduced with little or no reduction of others' happiness. Do such opportunities remain? The authors say yes, for two main reasons: 1. They require substantial changes to established moral norms. 2. Those suffering lie outside our sphere of concern. First, consider category 1. ### End-of-life decisions In <2009>, developed , progressively losing muscle function until death through respiratory failure. She wanted control over her time of death. then permitted (withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment), but prohibited prescription-based . Passive euthanasia was prohibited because it contradicted traditional ethics' "Do not kill innocent people." Rule-based ethics problematically bases decisions with enormous consequences on minor distinctions: ending life by turning off a machine is legal, administering a drug illegal, even when requested. Supporting Taylor need not require utilitarianism: [rights theory](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Rights%20view.txt) could defend a 'right to die.' But what logical grounds extend the into a right to die, then a right to assistance in dying? This is one difficulty for rights theory. , permitting killing innocents usually produces terrible results. A utilitarian killing people because life supposedly contains more suffering than happiness directly deprives them of potential happiness and indirectly devastates survivors. Taylor differs. Dying slowly in extreme pain from , she hardly loses potential happiness. Friends not wanting her prolonged suffering would experience less, not more, grief through euthanasia. Consequentialist judgment is cleaner than rights theory here. Judge carefully considered the issues, heard international specialists, and examined places permitting , including the and , especially potential abuse. She allowed passive euthanasia, enabling terminally ill people in to receive it. ### Ethics and animals concerns human death, prompting many to retain traditional views. Killing elicits entirely different attitudes: humans kill countless animals for trivial reasons—sport, clothing, taste—inflicting enormous needless suffering. Clearly animal interests receive almost no concern. *( criticized [Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Peter%20Singer.txt)'s calling taste trivial as dismissing gourmets' important rights. Calling Regan a more 'radical' animal advocate than Singer is badly mistaken. --ak)* This attitude violates [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt). Although views on animals' painless deaths differ, every prominent utilitarian regards animal and human suffering as equally important. 's includes every suffering being's interests in moral consideration. No laws then prohibited animal abuse; over two centuries later, protection remains extremely limited, permitting [factory farming](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Factory%20farming.txt)'s vast violence. is harder because potential benefits greatly exceed meat-eating's. Utilitarians and [rights theorists](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Rights%20view.txt) often diverge: some rights theorists view rights as absolute, prohibiting every experiment; utilitarians recognize no unconditional rules. Many experiments abuse animals for trivial purposes such as cosmetics. Some medical research, however, may have substantial potential value. Experiments may be justified only if every condition below is met: 1. Is there a substantial chance of developing drugs preventing death or suffering for many animals/humans? 2. Is experimenting on some animals the only route, with beneficiaries vastly outnumbering them? 3. Have all possible procedures minimizing experimental animals' suffering been followed? 4. Would investing the same time and money outside drug development yield no greater benefit? ### Effective altruism advocated taxes supporting poor people's welfare, including those impoverished through irresponsible behavior, not merely the "deserving" poor as contemporaries held. The rich suffer less from paying taxes than the poor from starving. Transport and logistics limited Bentham's era but hardly constrain us now, allowing global extension. Utilitarian and religious action brought global extreme poverty below 10% after <2015>. *(This statistic may be wrong. See Chapter 2 of [Limitarianism: The case against extreme wealth](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Limitarianism%20-%20The%20case%20against%20extreme%20wealth.txt). --ak)* Yet wealthy-country residents indulge in extreme luxury while others starve. began in <2009> to address this, influenced by [Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Peter%20Singer.txt)'s . Doing good is insufficient: do the most effective good, evaluating causes and charities through evidence. It emphasizes impartiality beyond kinship, locality, and nationality. *(Another example: effective altruists meta-analyze scientific studies to gather evidence about how much different animals suffer. See [Sentience table](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Sentience%20table.txt). --ak)* *(Effective altruism also connects with positions I consider dangerous or radical, such as or . Caution is needed. For Singer's positions, see [Singer on AI, Transhumanism, and Ethics](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Singer%20on%20AI,%20Transhumanism,%20and%20Ethics.txt). --ak)* ### Population puzzles noted total happiness can rise as population increases despite lower average happiness. *(Ten people at happiness 10 total 100; double population to twenty at slightly reduced happiness 8, and the total becomes 160. --ak)* Should [utilitarians](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) maximize total or average happiness? *(Not an idle puzzle: it concerns epidemic and human-extinction prevention. --ak)* Sidgwick favored totals. The authors agree, offering this thought experiment: > Paradise Continent contains only people scoring 99 out of 100 in happiness; its statistical agency reports an average of 99. Next year explorers discover a New Continent, equally populous, averaging 90. Excitement raises Paradise's average one point to 100. > > Recalculating with the New Continent, the agency finds the average has fallen to 95. Paradise's happiness rose, the New Continent's remained unchanged. Is a lower average bad? No. Hence evaluating totals rather than averages seems justified. Conversely, is a world of 100 barely nonmiserable people at happiness 10 (total 1,000) really better than ten very happy people at 90 (total 900)? Here the average seems more important. ### Gross national happiness Paradise and the New Continent are unfortunately fictional, but reality has similar concepts. Since <2012>, the has estimated and published , influenced by , which already evaluated every policy through , reportedly leading to a tobacco-sales ban. Chapter 4 examined happiness measurement's difficulties. Can happiness realistically evaluate government policy? Sociologists mainly measure it in two ways: 1. Add happy moments and subtract unhappy ones. 2. Ask for numerical ratings of life satisfaction so far. , , and lead using the first; wealthy countries such as using the second. Cultural factors may influence the former, objective health, education, and living standards the latter. Whether results across cultures/languages compare directly remains questionable. Following the UN, countries and international bodies began measuring happiness as an important indicator. The launched the in <2013>; the also began tracking related measures. Scientific happiness research should strengthen efforts to consider it in policy. would have been pleased.