# Singer vs. Regan > Peter Singer, author of Animal liberation, supports animal liberation on utilitarian grounds. Tom Regan, author of The case for animal rights, supports animal rights on the basis of the rights view. While working together in the movement, they continually debated their philosophical differences. Here is a brief account of their ideas and disagreements. [Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Peter%20Singer.txt), author of [Animal liberation](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Animal%20liberation.txt), supports animal liberation on [utilitarian](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) grounds. , author of , supports animal rights on the basis of the [rights view](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Rights%20view.txt). While working together in the movement, they continually debated their philosophical differences. Here is a brief account of their ideas and disagreements. ## A history of the debate Singer [published](https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1973/04/05/animal-liberation/) an essay titled "Animal Liberation" in _The New York Review_ in <1973>, followed two years later, in <1975>, by the book [Animal liberation](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Animal%20liberation.txt). In <1980>, Regan published [Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265001) in _Philosophy and Public Affairs_. He argues that Singer's [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) is an unsuitable philosophical foundation for the animal movement and calls for a movement grounded in . Singer's response, [Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265002), appeared in the same journal. Regan published in <1983>, critically assessing [Animal liberation](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Animal%20liberation.txt) and proposing an alternative. In January 1985, Singer marked the tenth anniversary of [Animal liberation](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Animal%20liberation.txt) with [Ten Years of Animal Liberation](https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/01/17/ten-years-of-animal-liberation/) in _The New York Review_. It describes achievements and summarizes debates among scholars and activists, including a critical assessment of Regan's . This prompted a further exchange, with one response from each, published that April as [The Dog in the Lifeboat](https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/04/25/the-dog-in-the-lifeboat-an-exchange/). Similar debates continued afterward, without major changes in either position. Regan died in <2017>. Singer wrote that he had heard the sad news that Tom Regan, a pioneer in animal philosophy whom he had known since <1973>, had died that morning. ## Different starting points: utilitarianism and deontology ### Singer's utilitarianism Singer is a [utilitarian](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Utilitarianism.txt). He calls beings capable of pleasure or pain—[sentience](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Sentience.txt), in the terminology of Korean high-school textbooks—[sentient beings](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Sentient%20being.txt). Because they have interests, those interests deserve equal consideration, whether the beings are human or not. This is the [principle of equal consideration](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Principle%20of%20equal%20consideration.txt). A morally right action, on this view, contributes to . [Factory farming](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Factory%20farming.txt), , circuses, and products made from animals, such as and fur, inflict enormous suffering on animals for minor human interests and are therefore immoral. These practices should all be abolished. ### Regan's rights view Regan is a . He defines beings with beliefs, desires, perception, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life, preferences, the ability to pursue goals, continuing identity, and so on as [subjects-of-a-life](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Subject%20of%20a%20life.txt), using the criteria in the 1983 first edition of . All such beings have inherent value and therefore moral rights. A morally right action respects these rights. [Factory farming](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Factory%20farming.txt), , circuses, and products made from animals, such as and fur, use animals merely as means to human ends. They do not respect their rights and are therefore immoral. These practices should all be abolished. ### Similarities and differences Both agree on the need for the animal movement and on almost every major practical issue, including abolishing factory farming. Since Singer emphasizes consequences while Regan emphasizes duties, one might initially assume that Singer permits meat-eating or experimentation when necessary, while Regan never permits either. Many organizations and individuals say this; Regan himself does too. Because their differences are rarely apparent in ordinary situations, exposing the theoretical differences between utilitarianism and deontology requires artificially constructed, extreme scenarios. One such debate between them is the "dog in the lifeboat." ## The dog in the lifeboat ### Who should be thrown overboard: a dog or a person? In , Regan addresses the criticism that traditional ethics is too rigid for practical use. He tries to show that a deontological approach can reach conclusions matching most people's intuitive judgments across different situations. Consider his hypothetical: > Four ordinary humans and a dog escape a shipwreck into a lifeboat. The boat is overloaded: unless one individual—one of the humans or the dog—is thrown overboard, all will sink and die. What should they do? Most people's intuitive judgment would be to throw the overboard. Singer and Regan both agree, but for different reasons. For Singer, humans and dogs are all [sentient beings](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Sentient%20being.txt), so their interests deserve equal consideration. For why equal consideration differs from equal treatment, see [Clarifying misconceptions about Peter Singer](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Clarifying%20misconceptions%20about%20Peter%20Singer.txt). Humans, however, have additional interests associated with comparatively greater capacities to plan for the future, among other things. If one of the four humans had irreversible brain damage that substantially reduced their cognitive capacities, Singer would say to throw that human overboard instead. Choosing the dog when the four humans are "ordinary" is therefore not [speciesism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Speciesism.txt): equality means equal _consideration_ of interests, not identical _treatment_ ([Principle of equal consideration](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Principle%20of%20equal%20consideration.txt)). For Regan, humans and dogs are all [subjects-of-a-life](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Subject%20of%20a%20life.txt) with equal inherent value. But because humans have relatively greater capacities to plan for the future and so on, death harms a human more than a dog. If one of the four had irreversible brain damage that substantially reduced their cognitive capacities, Regan would also choose that human rather than the dog. Choosing the dog in the ordinary case is therefore not [speciesism](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Speciesism.txt) either. The conclusion is the same. Singer judges by interests—pleasure and suffering—while Regan judges by overridden rights and the resulting harm. But they are not identical. Singer's utilitarianism assesses actions by aggregating or averaging interests; Regan's [rights view](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Rights%20view.txt) does not. If the choice were between saving four humans and a million dogs, Singer would probably save the million dogs, while Regan would save the four humans. A million is merely an expression for a large number: Regan's position would in fact allow throwing an unlimited number of dogs overboard. ### Experiments on a million dogs In [Ten Years of Animal Liberation](https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/01/17/ten-years-of-animal-liberation/), Singer criticizes this position. Regan says a million dogs may be killed to save humans in the lifeboat, yet also says can never be justified. Singer argues that these claims are incompatible. The debate did not end there. Each responded once more, in the correspondence published as [The Dog in the Lifeboat](https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1985/04/25/the-dog-in-the-lifeboat-an-exchange/). Regan argues there is no contradiction because experimentation differs from the lifeboat. Animals in experiments would not have suffered without human intervention and are forced into the situation. The dog in the lifeboat would die even if not thrown overboard and was not forced into the boat. Its right to respectful treatment therefore has not been violated. Singer proposes another scenario: a fatal infects humans and dogs, and developing a lifesaving drug requires experimenting on infected individuals who will soon die. Neither infection nor their predicament was forced on them by humans, and the infected dogs will die whether experimented on or not. The situation now resembles the lifeboat. Applying Regan's own reasoning, Singer says, would justify experimenting on a million dogs. I have not found Regan's answer to this objection. Based on my reading, however, I would expect him to say experimentation is right in this case: as in the lifeboat, there has been no rights violation. ### Is Regan's rights view wrong? Does that make Regan's theory wrong? Singer does not say so. He is not claiming that the rights view is wrong in the first place. He is challenging claims that utilitarianism has defects from which the rights view is exempt. Regan sometimes says his deontology condemns every animal experiment in every circumstance, while Singer's utilitarianism can sometimes justify experimentation, so Singer is not an abolitionist. It is this claim that Singer disputes. Singer wants experimentation abolished as much as Regan does. His point is simply that both theories must acknowledge some extreme situations in which it can be justified. ## An imaginary interview To compare Singer's [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Utilitarianism.txt) with Regan's [rights view](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Rights%20view.txt), I imagined how each might answer the same questions. **These are my reconstructions, not an actual interview.** ### Theoretical background What qualifies a being for moral consideration? - **Singer:** A being capable of pleasure or pain is a **sentient being**. - **Regan:** A being with beliefs, desires, perception, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life, preferences, the ability to pursue goals, continuing identity, and so on is a **subject-of-a-life**. Where are the species boundaries of moral consideration? - **Singer:** Animals with a central and are sentient. This includes almost all and many , with judgment suspended toward the boundary. - **Regan:** The 1983 first edition includes mentally normal aged one or older. The preface to the <2004> revised edition extends the scope to , withholding judgment on fish. What deserves moral consideration? - **Singer:** Sentient beings have interests in seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. **Interests** of equal magnitude deserve **equal consideration**, irrespective of species. - **Regan:** Subjects-of-a-life have equal **inherent value**. Their **moral rights** must therefore be respected, whether or not they can fulfill moral duties themselves. ### Factory farming Why is factory farming wrong? - **Singer:** It inflicts relatively great suffering on relatively many animals for relatively minor pleasures enjoyed by relatively few humans. - **Regan:** Using animals as tools for human pleasure violates their rights. Would improving welfare within factory farming be good? - **Singer:** Ultimately, factory farming should be abolished, but immediate abolition is practically impossible, so several strategies are needed. Welfare improvements have advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are: 1) even small reductions in the suffering of many animals currently in the system, and 2) broader discussion of welfare improves public awareness, potentially reducing long-term meat demand and bringing abolition closer. The disadvantages are: 1) welfare within factory farming has limits, and 2) it can mislead the public and conceal the problems of meat-eating. On balance, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, so improvement is good. - **Regan:** Factory farming should be abolished. (I have not found a more detailed account of his position, but there are clues. According to the revised preface to , he wrote it between September 1980 and November 1981, dating the original preface November 26, 1981. He began as a welfare advocate but finished as an abolitionist. Looking back, he says that while working on chapter 6 and beyond, writing began leading his thinking rather than the reverse. Yet even the original preface, written after this change, still discusses improved treatment and welfare. He may therefore have considered welfare improvement necessary alongside abolition in principle.) ### Animal experimentation Why is experimentation for cosmetics wrong? - **Singer:** It inflicts relatively great suffering on relatively many animals for relatively trivial benefits. - **Regan:** Using animals as tools for cosmetics development violates their right to respectful treatment. A virus infects both humans and dogs. All will soon die unless a is developed. Experimenting on humans or dogs is highly likely to produce a vaccine quickly, and no alternative exists. Should we experiment? - **Singer:** If the probability of preventing human and canine deaths or suffering is sufficiently high, no nonexperimental alternative exists, vastly more animals benefit than are experimented on, and using the same resources elsewhere would not produce a greater benefit, we should experiment. Every available means must be used to minimize the subjects' suffering. - **Regan:** Unlike ordinary experiments, in which humans unilaterally capture and kill animals that would otherwise live, nobody was forced into this situation, so there has been no rights violation. All would die without the experiment, so we should proceed. ### Comparing the magnitude of harm In that scenario, human experimentation requires one person, who suffers for two years. Canine experimentation requires a hundred dogs, each suffering for one year. Should we use one human or a hundred dogs? - **Singer:** Assuming no others suffer from witnessing the human's or dogs' suffering, minimizing the aggregate suffering and death means choosing the human. (1 human × 2 years = 2 individual-years; 100 dogs × 1 year = 100 individual-years.) - **Regan:** The says that when individual harms are comparable, choose the option harming fewer individuals. Here the harms differ—two years for the human, one for each dog—so the principle does not apply. Unlike [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Utilitarianism.txt), it does not aggregate harms across individuals. When harms differ, the protects the rights of those facing the greater individual harm, again without adding up numbers. We should therefore use the hundred dogs rather than the one human. What if the choice is between one human suffering for one year and a hundred dogs suffering for one year each? - **Singer:** Still choose the human. (1 × 1 year = 1 individual-year; 100 × 1 year = 100 individual-years.) - **Regan:** Because the harms are comparable, the miniride principle selects the one human. What if the human suffers for six months, versus a hundred dogs for one year each? - **Singer:** Still choose the human. (1 × 0.5 years = 0.5 individual-years; 100 × 1 year = 100 individual-years.) - **Regan:** Because the harms differ, the miniride principle cannot apply; the worse-off principle does. Choose the human. What if the human suffers for one year, versus a hundred dogs for two days each? - **Singer:** Choose the hundred dogs. (1 × 365 days = 365 individual-days; 100 × 2 days = 200 individual-days.) - **Regan:** Because the harms differ, use the worse-off principle rather than the miniride principle. The human faces the greater individual harm, so choose the hundred dogs instead. (Here the conclusion matches Singer's.) ## Conclusions ### Philosophy and practice Despite their clear philosophical differences, both agree that their positions coincide in most actual situations, as opposed to bizarre hypotheticals. In [Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265001), Regan writes: > Philosophers are notorious for disagreeing. Give two philosophers the same premises and they will reach different conclusions, each claiming to have followed them faithfully. Give them the same conclusion and they will surely disagree about the premises. My essay belongs to the latter category. Singer and I agree that we have a duty to be vegetarians. That is our shared conclusion. We disagree about why we have that duty. Singer repeatedly expresses the same view. The final paragraph of the lifeboat exchange says: > On practical matters, Regan and I agree completely. In a society where these practices remain widely accepted, our philosophical differences make no difference. ### Distorting another's position to sharpen one's own According to the revised preface to , Regan wrote the book from September 1980 to November 1981, dating the original preface November 26, 1981. He began as a welfare advocate and finished as an abolitionist. He recalls that while writing chapter 6 and beyond, writing began to lead his thinking rather than the reverse. Yet the original preface, written after his change, still discusses welfare and improved treatment. Nor do the principles of his [rights view](https://wiki.g15e.com/en/pages/Rights%20view.txt) say is wrong in every possible circumstance. The , for example, requires overriding the rights of the smallest group when overriding rights is unavoidable. The requires protecting those who would suffer relatively greater harm. Regan's criticism that Singer does not oppose experimentation in principle under every possible circumstance is therefore inconsistent: Regan's own theory is the same in this respect. According to [Utilitarianism - A very short introduction](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Utilitarianism%20-%20A%20very%20short%20introduction.txt), experimentation justified on Singer's terms must meet every one of the following conditions. Almost all actual animal experiments fail them, so there is no practical difference from abolitionism—only a difference in its ethical grounds. - A reasonable prospect of developing a drug that prevents the deaths or suffering of many animals or humans. - No way to achieve this without experimenting on some animals, with vastly more animals benefiting than being used. - Every available procedure to minimize suffering is followed. - The same time and money would not produce a greater benefit if invested outside drug development. People sometimes disparage or distort a familiar position to distinguish and sharpen their own. I think there is something of that in Regan's claims about Singer.