# Rights View > A theory of the moral rights of animals put forward by the moral philosopher and animal rights activist Tom Regan in his book The Case for Animal Rights. A theory of the moral rights of animals put forward by the moral philosopher and animal rights activist in his book . ## Subject-of-a-life According to the rights view, every being that has beliefs, desires, perception, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life capable of feeling pleasure and pain, interests and concerns, the ability to act in order to achieve desires and goals, a continuing psychological identity over time, welfare, and so on, is a [subject-of-a-life](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Subject%20of%20a%20life.txt), and every subject-of-a-life has equal inherent value and, accordingly, moral rights. ## Difference from Kantian deontology says in the [Formula of Humanity](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Humanity%20formula.txt) that most humans have reason and the ability to set their own ends in accordance with reason and pursue them, and he calls such human beings persons. He calls this characteristic, which only persons possess, humanity. Because all persons have humanity, unlike other animals they possess dignity, and they simultaneously have a right to be respected by other persons and a duty to respect other persons. Regan criticizes the fact that, according to Kant's Formula of Humanity, one is led to the conclusion that some humans—such as zygotes, embryos, fetuses, infants in their first few years, and comatose humans—are human but not persons, because they lack the ability to set ends according to reason and pursue them; therefore they lack humanity and dignity, and thus have no right to be respected. The concept of a **subject-of-a-life** is proposed in this context. Regan also distinguishes between and moral patients, and argues that moral patients, although they lack the capacity to perform moral duties, nonetheless have moral rights. Most and some , as subjects-of-a-life, are given the status of moral patients and accordingly have moral rights. ## The miniride principle and the worse-off principle According to the , when the harms suffered by individual beings are comparable, one should choose the option in which as few individuals as possible suffer harm. However, when the magnitude of the harms suffered by individuals differs, this principle cannot be applied. This is because, unlike [utilitarianism](https://wiki.g15e.com/pages/Utilitarianism.txt), the miniride principle does not aggregate the magnitudes of harms suffered by different beings. When the magnitude of the harms differs, one should apply the and choose the option that protects the rights of those who would suffer the greater harm.